Global Public Goods

Recognition of the interdependencies characterizing the Earth (a global common) and the globalization phenomenon necessitate collective actions at the global level to solve multilateral issues in trade, finance, environment, spread of infectious diseases and security. There is also growing awareness that the existing institutional arrangements to solve multilateral issues exhibit signs of adaptive (dynamic) inefficiency, with institutional changes lagging behind rapidly evolving realities as manifested in growing tensions in reaching cooperative solutions. An International Task Force on Global Public Goods was constituted in 2003 to identify relevant international public goods froma perspective of reducing poverty and to study the provision and financing issues. See International Task Force on Global Public Goods (2006). This Task Force has identified the following priority global public goods (GPGs) : (a) preventing the emergence and spread of infectious disease, (b) tackling climate change, (c) enhancing international financial stability, (d) strengthening the international trading system, (e) achieving peace and security, and (f) generating knowledge. We need a framework for defining, identifying, providing and financing GPGs. Section 2 reviews alternative approaches to defining GPGs. Section 3 classifies GPGs into two categories : pure global public goods and global public goods by global public choice. Section 4 considers delivery systems for GPGs. It assesses the existing institutional frameworks for the supply of pureGPGs through the lens of GPGframework developed by Kaul et al (2003). Then it considers the division of labour among stakeholders at global, national and state levels using the Subsidiarity Principle. Finally, it suggests some changes in the delivery systemfor an efficient provision of GPGs. Section 5 explores the financing options. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.global public goods, globalization, International Task Force, GPG, pure global public goods, global public goods

Effect of depreciation of the public goods in spatial public goods games

In this work, depreciated effect of the public goods is considered in the public goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r' = r(nc/G)^beta (beat>= 0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit of the public goods if all the players of this group are cooperators, otherwise, the value of the public goods is reduced to r'. It is found that compared with the original version (beta = 0), emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for beta > 0, and there exit optimal values of beta inducing the best cooperation. Moreover, the optimal plat of beta broadens as r increases. Furthermore, effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation is studied, it is presented that variation of cooperator density with the noise is dependent of the value of beta and r, and cooperation dominates over most of the range of noise at an intermediate value of beta = 1.0. We study the initial distribution of the multiplication factor at beta = 1.0, and find that all the distributions can be described as Gauss distribution

Public Action for Public Goods

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of these intuitive theoretical arguments rely on special additional assumptions that are often not made clear. We then review the empirical work based on the predictions of these models of collective action. While the available evidence is generally consistent with these theories, there is a dearth of quality evidence. Moreover, a large part of the variation in access to public goods seems to have nothing to do with the "bottom-up" forces highlighted in these models and instead reflect more "top-down" interventions. We conclude with a discussion of some of the historical evidence on top-down interventions.

Bargaining over Public Goods

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bar- gaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lin- dahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The pro- cedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.public goods; alternating offers bargaining

OCIS Public Goods Tool Development

There has recently been an increase in interest amongst policy-makers in the question of whether farming provides a “public good” beyond the simple production of food, which justifies support from, for instance, EU agricultural policy. Benefits such as an improved environment or better water quality can be perceived to be public goods. It is the provision of these sorts of benefits which may be used in the future to justify continued support of the agricultural sector through subsidies. Given the current level of interest in this topic Natural England, with the approval of Defra, through OCIS (Organic Conversion Information Service), wished to create a tool which could be used by an advisor or an informed land owner to assess the public good provided by a/their farm. Thus, the OCIS Public Good Tool was developed

Bargaining Over Public Goods

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.

Public Goods and Territory

The paper will attempt to demostrate the fundamental importance of public goods in the performance of any territory or economy. After discussing the concept and definition of public goods, the most important of them will be reviewed along with their degree of publicness. Their relative positions within society will also be analyzed. Finally, the relationship between private and public goods will be discussed and some conclusions will be reached as to the necessary balance and relative importance among them.

Decentralising Public Goods Production

Decentralised decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the production of public goods is analysed within a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and no pure profits. It is shown that decentralisation (i) does not necessarily imply aggregate production effciency and (ii) need not be optimal even if all public goods are neutral. Also, cost benefit criteria are derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterised.Cost benefit criteria; marginal cost of public funds; production effciency; delegation; decentralisation.